

# Emergence of cooperation: Growing habitat with empty sites

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
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
## Motivation

### Prisoner's dilemma game

- Possible action: Cooperation (C) and Defection (D)
- Payoff matrix




### How does cooperation emerge?



## Combining strategy dynamics and population dynamics

## Model

### Birth and death processes with an infinite 1-dimensional lattice



**Death** : an individual who lives in an occupied site dies with death probability.

**Birth** : an empty site is occupied by neighboring agent's offspring.

#### Algorithm

- Select a site  $i$  at random
- If  $S_i = C$ , or  $D$  : Death process  
 $S_i = E$  : Birth process
- Iterate 1-2

#### Death probability

$$\frac{1}{1 + Ae^{\omega p_i}}$$

$p_i$  : total payoff  
 $\omega$  : selectivity ( $\omega = 1$ )  
 $A$  : fitness parameter ( $>0$ )

#### Simplified PDG payoff matrix


$$M = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} C & D & E \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} C \\ D \end{matrix} & \begin{pmatrix} b-c & -c & 0 \\ b & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \end{matrix}$$

$$\begin{cases} 0 < c < b \\ b = 1 \end{cases}$$

#### $i$ -th site's total payoff


$$p_i = M_{S_i S_{i-1}} + M_{S_i S_{i+1}}, S_i \in \{C, D, E\}$$

#### Mutation $\mu$



## Without mutation

### Absorbing transition points $A_c$




### Mean-field calculation

$$V_D = 2 \left[ 1 - \alpha \rho \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} n(1-\rho)^{n-1} \right] = 2 \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{\rho} \right)$$

$\rho$  : population density  $\alpha$  : death probability


$$\frac{d\rho}{dt} = (1-\rho)(2\rho - \rho^2) - \alpha\rho = 0 \text{ (at steady state)}$$

$$V_D = 2 \left[ 1 - \frac{2}{3(A+1) - \sqrt{(A+1)(A+5)}} \right]$$



$$V = 0 \text{ at } A_c^D$$


### Phase diagram



**In the region-II, only the cooperators can survive.**


## With mutation

### Absorbing transition points $A_c^\mu$



Initial condition dependency disappears.

### Phase diagram ( $\mu = 0.001$ )



**Empty sites protect the cooperators from the invasion of defectors, and cooperators can survive even though  $c/b > 1/k$ .**

## Summary and discussion

- We have considered the population dynamics as well as the strategy dynamics by introducing empty sites.
- We have found that the empty sites created from population dynamics construct spatial structure and develop the cooperative society.
- Our model in 2-dimensional lattice: future research.